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Abstract. Multiplicative linear secret sharing is a fundamental notion in the area of secure
multiparty computation and, since recently, in the area of two-party cryptography as well. In a
nutshell, this notion guarantees that the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the
vector consisting of the coordinatewise product of two respective share-vectors. This paper focuses
on the following foundational question, which is novel to the best of our knowledge. Suppose we
abandon the latter linearity condition and instead require that this product is obtained by some,
not-necessarily-linear “product reconstruction function.” Is the resulting notion equivalent to mul-
tiplicative linear secret sharing? We show the (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) result that this
relaxed notion is strictly more general. Concretely, fix a finite field Fq as the base field over which
linear secret sharing is considered. Then we show there exists an (exotic) linear secret sharing scheme
with an unbounded number of players n such that it has t-privacy with t = Ω(n) and such that it
does admit a product reconstruction function, yet this function is necessarily nonlinear. In addition,
we determine the minimum number of players for which those exotic schemes exist. Our proof is
based on combinatorial arguments involving quadratic forms. It extends to similar separation results
for important variations, such as strongly multiplicative secret sharing.
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1. Introduction. Multiplicative linear secret sharing is a fundamental notion in
the area of secure multiparty computation (MPC). By extension, this holds in the area
of two-party cryptography as well, by virtue of recently discovered deep applications
of MPC to two-party cryptography as initiated in [12].
While linear secret sharing is additive in the sense that the sum of share-vectors
corresponds to the sum of the secrets, multiplicative linear secret sharing enjoys the
further property that the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the
vector consisting of the coordinatewise product of two respective share-vectors. There
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LSSS WITH NONLINEAR PRODUCT RECONSTRUCTION 1115
are several important (more demanding) variations on this notion, such as strongly
multiplicative secret sharing. First framed and studied in [8] in the late 1990s as an
abstract property of a linear secret sharing scheme,1 it had been implicit in several
results since the mid 1980s (notably [2, 5, 11]) in the context of application of Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [16] to (information-theoretically) secure multiparty computa-
tion. The asymptotical (constant-rate) theory of strongly multiplicative schemes has
been initiated in [6], using algebraic geometry.2 It has found several notable applica-
tions, starting with [12]. For a full discussion and references, please refer to [4].
This paper focuses on the following foundational question, which is novel to the
best of our knowledge. Suppose we abandon the latter linearity condition and instead
require that the product of the two secrets is obtained by application of some, not-
necessarily-linear product reconstruction function. Is the resulting notion equivalent
to multiplicative linear secret sharing?
We show the (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) result that this relaxed notion
is strictly more general. Concretely, fix a finite field Fq as the base field Fq over which
linear secret sharing is considered. Then we show there exists an (exotic) linear secret
sharing scheme with an unbounded number of players n such that it has t-privacy
with t = Ω(n) and such that it does admit a product reconstruction function, yet this
function is necessarily nonlinear.
The existence of such counterexamples can be explained from the difference be-
tween linear and algebraic independence of certain multivariate polynomials. For
instance, the polynomials X , Y , XY are linearly independent but algebraically de-
pendent. Nevertheless, since the involved polynomials are homogeneous with degree
2, quadratic forms are a powerful tool to solve our problem.
Indeed, by means of combinatorial arguments involving bilinear and quadratic
forms, we find examples of linear secret sharing schemes with nonlinear product re-
construction on a small number of players. Our main result is then obtained by
composing those small examples with multiplicative linear secret sharing schemes on
an arbitrary number of players n that have t-privacy with t = Ω(n). The existence
of such schemes over any fixed base field Fq was proved in [3, 7]. As an additional
result, we determine the minimum number of players for which such exotic schemes
exist. Our results extend to similar separation results for important variations, such
as strongly multiplicative secret sharing.
It is an interesting question whether there are applications of this exotic, novel
class of secret sharing schemes with nonlinear product reconstruction3 to crypto-
graphic protocols, but we will not offer any speculations here.
We remark that, while the notion of multiplicativity defined in [8] applies to
linear secret sharing schemes where each share may consist of an arbitrary number
of elements of the field Fq, in this work our definitions and results concern only ideal
linear secret sharing schemes, i.e., those where each share is a single element of the
field Fq. This is the notion considered in, e.g., [3, 6, 7]. If the local function is
the componentwise product of the share-vectors, then the analysis is the same for
both cases. If any bilinear function can be used in the local computations, then the
1It was shown, in particular, when and how a multiplicative scheme can be obtained from just a
linear secret sharing scheme. However, this does not work for strong multiplicativity.
2Later, this asymptotical theory was also developed in the case of multiplicative schemes using
classical coding theory in [5]. The results there do not seem to carry over easily to strong multiplica-
tive schemes.
3All applications of multiplicative linear secret sharing we are aware of make essential use of
linearity of product reconstruction.
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1116 CASCUDO, CRAMER, MIRANDOLA, PADRO´, AND XING
general case can be reduced to the case of ideal schemes (maybe except for fields of
characteristic 2).4
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we recall some elementary theory
of bilinear and quadratic forms over finite fields. In section 3, we review the standard
definition of multiplicative linear secret sharing in Definition 3.1. In section 4, we
formally define our relaxation of multiplicative linear secret sharing in Definition 4.1
and state in Main Theorem 4.3 our main separation result, i.e., the existence of exotic
schemes with an unbounded number of players n and t-privacy with t = Ω(n).
In section 5, we show that both the multiplicativity notion and its relaxed notion
of product reconstruction can be captured in terms of the existence of quadratic forms
with certain algebraic conditions imposed on them (see Propositions 5.1 and 5.2).
This leads us to defining the “separating quadratic forms,” which are characterized in
Propositions 5.3 and 5.4 by using the classification of quadratic forms over finite fields.
By using those results, several examples of linear secret sharing schemes that
prove the separation between the two notions are presented in section 6. Specifically,
for every finite field Fq, we present examples of Fq-linear secret sharing schemes with
nonlinear product reconstruction on n players, where n = 9 if q ≥ 3 and n = 14 if
q = 2.
In section 7, we review a well-known method of combining secret sharing schemes
and we analyze the behavior of product reconstruction under this composition in
Propositions 7.2 and 7.3. At this point, Main Theorem 4.3 is proved by composing
the examples on a small number of players presented in section 6 with multiplicative
linear secret sharing schemes whose privacy is linear on the number of players. More-
over, this composition technique makes it possible to extend our results to strongly
multiplicative secret sharing.
Finally, in section 8, we prove that it is not possible to find examples separating
the two notions on less than nine players. Therefore, the examples presented in
section 6 are among the smallest ones.
2. Preliminaries. We fix notation for linear algebra, and we recall some basic
facts about bilinear and quadratic forms. Most of the material covered in this section
(tensor products, bilinear and quadratic forms) can be found in algebra handbooks
such as [14]. More specific references concerning classification of quadratic forms will
be given later.
Let Fq denote a finite field of cardinality q = p
m. The prime number p is the
characteristic of Fq and is denoted by charFq. Let V be an Fq-vector space with
dimV = k. If S ⊂ V is a nonempty set, then 〈S〉 denotes the span of S, that is,
the Fq-linear subspace of V generated by the elements of S. The Fq-vector space V
∗
of the linear forms V → Fq is called the dual space of V . If {e1, . . . , ek} is a basis
of V , its dual basis is the basis {e1, . . . , ek} of V ∗ whose elements are determined by
ei(ej) = 1 if i = j and e
i(ej) = 0 otherwise. For reference later on, we include the
following trivial lemma.
Lemma 2.1. Let V be an Fq-vector space, W ⊂ V a vector subspace, and x ∈ V .
Then x /∈ W if and only if there is a linear form α ∈ V ∗ such that α(x) = 0 and
α(y) = 0 for every y ∈ W .
A bilinear form on V is a map B : V × V → Fq such that, for all x, y, z ∈ V ,
λ ∈ Fq, the following holds:
4Of course our results do not rule out that separating examples with a smaller number of players
exist in the nonideal case, but we do not elaborate further on this matter.
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LSSS WITH NONLINEAR PRODUCT RECONSTRUCTION 1117
• B(x+ y, z) = B(x, z) +B(y, z).
• B(x, y + z) = B(x, y) +B(x, z).
• B(λx, y) = B(x, λy) = λB(x, y).
The vector space formed by all bilinear forms on V is denoted by Bil(V ). By
the universal property of the tensor product, there exists an isomorphism V ∗ ⊗ V ∗ ∼=
Bil(V ) mapping α⊗β ∈ V ∗⊗V ∗ into the bilinear form on V defined by α⊗β(x, y) =
α(x)β(y) for all x, y ∈ V . By duality, there is an isomorphism V ⊗V ∼= Bil(V ∗) which
maps x ⊗ y ∈ V ⊗ V into x ⊗ y(α, β) := α(x)β(y). The bilinear forms α ⊗ β span
Bil(V ). Moreover, if {ei}1≤i≤k is a basis of V ∗, then {ei ⊗ ej}1≤i,j≤k is a basis of
Bil(V ), which has dimension k2.
Moreover, there is an isomorphism V ⊗ V ∼= Bil(V )∗ that maps x ⊗ y ∈ V ⊗ V
into the linear form on Bil(V ) determined by α ⊗ β → α(x)β(y). Composition with
the isomorphism Bil(V ∗) ∼= V ⊗ V described above yields an isomorphism Bil(V ∗) ∼=
Bil(V )∗ which maps B ∈ Bil(V ∗) into the linear form determined by α⊗β → B(α, β).
The matrix M of a bilinear form B on V with respect to a basis {ei}1≤i≤k of
V is M = (B(ei, ej))1≤i,j≤k. For a bilinear form B on V , consider the linear maps
B1 : V → V ∗ and B2 : V → V ∗, where, for every x ∈ V , the linear forms B1(x) and
B2(x) are defined by B1(x)(y) = B(x, y) and B2(x)(y) = B(y, x), respectively. The
linear maps B1 and B2 have the same rank, which is equal to the rank of any matrix
associated to B. This value is called the rank of the bilinear form B and is denoted
by rkB. A proof for the following lemma can be found in [1, II, section 7, number 8].
Lemma 2.2. The rank of a bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) equals the minimum integer
0 ≥ 0 such that there exist linear forms α1, . . . , α0 , β1, . . . , β0 ∈ V ∗ with B =∑0
i=1 α
i ⊗ βi.
The transpose of a bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) is the bilinear form Bt ∈ Bil(V )
defined by Bt(x, y) = B(y, x) for all x, y ∈ V . A bilinear formB ∈ Bil(V ) is symmetric
if B = Bt, and it is alternating if B(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V . The Fq-vector space
consisting of all symmetric (respectively, alternating) bilinear forms on V is denoted
by Sym(V ) (respectively, Alt(V )).
Lemma 2.3. For all B ∈ Alt(V ), it holds that B = −Bt. If the characteristic is
different from 2, the converse also holds.
Proof. For all x, y ∈ V , it holds that B(x + y, x + y) = B(x, x) + B(x, y) +
B(y, x) + B(y, y). Since B(x, x) = B(y, y) = B(x + y, x + y) = 0, it follows that
B(x, y) = −B(y, x). On the other hand, if B = −Bt, then B(x, x) = −B(x, x) for all
x ∈ V . This implies that B(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ V if the characteristic is different
from 2.
Lemma 2.4. If the characteristic is different from 2, then Bil(V ) is the direct
sum of Sym(V ) and Alt(V ).
Proof. If the characteristic is different from 2, then Sym(V ) ∩ Alt(V ) = {0} by
Lemma 2.3. In addition, for every B ∈ Bil(V ),
B =
B +Bt
2
+
B −Bt
2
.
The first and the second terms on the right-hand side are, respectively, in Sym(V )
and Alt(V ).
In some of our proofs in section 5, we will consider elements in Bil(V ) of the
form π ⊗ π for some π ∈ V ∗. These elements span the vector space Sym(V ) of the
symmetric bilinear forms on V . Indeed, if {e1, . . . , ek} is a basis of V ∗, then the terms
ei ⊗ ei with 1 ≤ i ≤ k and (ei + ej) ⊗ (ei + ej) with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ k constitute a basis
of Sym(V ), in particular, the dimension of Sym(V ) is k(k + 1)/2.
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1118 CASCUDO, CRAMER, MIRANDOLA, PADRO´, AND XING
A quadratic form on V is a map Q : V → Fq such that
• Q(λx) = λ2Q(x) for all x ∈ V, λ ∈ Fq,
• the map (x, y) → Q(x+ y)−Q(x)−Q(y) is a bilinear form on V .
The Fq-vector space of all quadratic forms on V is denoted by Quad(V ).
Every bilinear form B ∈ Bil(V ) defines a quadratic form QB : V → Fq on
V by taking QB(x) = B(x, x) for every x ∈ V . This induces an isomorphism
Bil(V )/Alt(V ) ∼= Quad(V ). By Lemma 2.4, if charFq = 2, this induces an iso-
morphism Sym(V ) ∼= Quad(V ) as well.
Lemma 2.5. There exists an isomorphism φ : Quad(V ∗) → Sym(V )∗ such that
φ(Q)(α ⊗ α) = Q(α) for all Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) and all α ∈ V ∗.
Proof. Recall that we have an isomorphism Bil(V ∗) ∼= Bil(V )∗ that maps B ∈
Bil(V ∗) into the linear form determined by α⊗ β → B(α, β). Composing it with the
restriction map Bil(V )∗ → Sym(V )∗, we obtain a surjective linear map Bil(V ∗) →
Sym(V )∗ whose kernel is Alt(V ∗). Indeed, B ∈ Bil(V ∗) is in the kernel if and only
if B(α, α) = 0 for every α ∈ V ∗. This gives an isomorphism Bil(V ∗)/Alt(V ∗) ∼=
Sym(V )∗, and the lemma follows composing it with the isomorphism Quad(V ∗) ∼=
Bil(V ∗)/Alt(V ∗) considered above.
We need to introduce some results about the classification of quadratic forms.
Proofs for these results can be found in [13, 15] for fields of odd characteristic and
in [9, 10] for the characteristic 2 case. Let Q1, Q2 be two quadratic forms on V . They
are said to be equivalent if there exists an automorphism ψ of V such thatQ1 = Q2◦ψ.
We associate to a quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ) the symmetric bilinear form
B˜Q ∈ Sym(V ) defined by (x, y) → Q(x + y) − Q(x) − Q(y). We define the radical
RadQ V of V with respect toQ as the kernel of the linear map (B˜Q)1 : V → V ∗, that is,
RadQ V := {x ∈ V : B˜Q(x, y) = 0 for all y ∈ V }.
First, consider the case charFq = 2. Then the map
Q → BQ := 1
2
B˜Q
is an isomorphism between the vector spaces Quad(V ) and Sym(V ). Let Q1, Q2 be
quadratic forms. Fix a basis of V and, for i = 1, 2, take the matrix Mi associated to
BQi . Then Q1 and Q2 are equivalent if and only if there exists an invertible matrix P
such thatM1 = PM2P
t. The rank of a quadratic form Q is defined as the rank of BQ.
If Q has full rank k, then the discriminant of Q is defined as the class in the group
F
∗
q/(F
∗
q)
2 ∼= {1,−1} of the determinant of any matrix associated to BQ. If Q has rank
r < k, then it induces a decomposition V = RadQ V ⊕V ′ such that V ′ has dimension
r and the restriction Q′ of Q to V ′ has full rank. In this case, the discriminant of Q is
defined to be the discriminant of Q′. It holds that two quadratic forms are equivalent
if and only if they have the same rank and the same discriminant [13].
Consider now the case charFq = 2. In this case, quadratic forms are classified by
the rank and the Arf invariant. Let Q be a quadratic form on V . In the characteristic
2 case, the rank is defined as follows. Let r′ be the codimension of RadQ V , which
is always even. If there exists x ∈ RadQ V such that Q(x) = 0, then we define the
rank of Q to be r′ + 1. In this case, the Arf invariant is not defined, as the rank
suffices to classify the forms: two quadratic forms having the same odd rank are
equivalent. Otherwise, i.e., if Q identically vanishes on RadQ V , the rank of Q is
defined to be r′. If Q has rank r = k = 2 and {v1, v2} is any Fq-basis of V , then
the Arf invariant of Q is defined to be the class of Q(v1)Q(v2)/(B˜Q(v1, v2))
2
in Fq/L,
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where L = {λ2 + λ : λ ∈ Fq}, the kernel of the trace map Tr: Fq → F2. Note
that Fq/L ∼= F2. In general, if Q has even rank r, then it induces a decomposition
V = RadQ V ⊕
⊕r/2
i=1 Vi. If, for i = 1, . . . , r/2, we denote by Qi the restriction of Q
to Vi, then the Arf invariant of Q is defined to be the sum of the Arf invariants of the
Qi’s. It holds that two quadratic forms having the same even rank are equivalent if
and only if they have the same Arf invariant.
3. Multiplicative linear secret sharing. For the purposes of this paper, a
linear secret sharing scheme Σ over Fq is a tuple (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) in the following con-
ditions:
• V is an Fq-vector space of finite dimension.
• π0 ∈ V ∗ \ {0} and π1, . . . , πn ∈ V ∗.
• π0 is in the span of {πi}ni=1.
The set {1, . . . , n} is the player set. Let A ⊂ {1, . . . , n} be a nonempty set. If
π0 ∈ 〈{πi}i∈A〉, then A is accepting. Otherwise, A is rejecting.
Let s ∈ Fq, the secret. Select x ∈ V uniformly at random such that π0(x) = s.
This is possible since π0 = 0. The elements π1(x), . . . , πn(x) are the shares. The joint
shares of A corresponds to the vector (πi(x))i∈A ∈ F|A|q .
If A is accepting, then there is an Fq-linear form ρ
A : F
|A|
q −→ Fq, the (linear)
reconstruction function for A, such that ρA((πi(x))i∈A) = π0(x) = s for all x ∈ Fkq .
In other words, if A is accepting, the secret can be reconstructed (linearly) from the
joint shares of A.
On the other hand, if A is nonempty and rejecting, then the random variable
(πi(x))i∈A does not depend on the choice of the secret s. To prove this claim, the
key observation is that, by Lemma 2.1, π0 /∈ 〈{πi}i∈A〉 if and only if there exists
z ∈ V (where z may depend on A) such that π0(z) = 1 and πi(z) = 0 for all
i ∈ A. Indeed, let s′ ∈ Fq be an arbitrary secret and write λ = s′ − s. Then
choosing x′ ∈ V uniformly at random with π0(x′) = s′ is equivalent to choosing
uniformly at random a vector of the form x + λz ∈ V with π0(x) = s. It holds that
(πi(x+ λz))i∈A = (πi(x) + λπi(z))i∈A = (πi(x))i∈A.
The access structure Γ(Σ) of the scheme collects the accepting sets, whereas the
adversary structure A(Σ) collects the rejecting sets. Let t, r be integers with 0 ≤ t <
r ≤ n. The scheme has r-reconstruction if Γ(Σ) contains all subsets of {1, . . . , n} of
cardinality at least r, and it has t-privacy if A(Σ) contains all subsets of {1, . . . , n}
of cardinality at most t. By definition, the scheme is n-reconstructing. Of course, it
could be r-reconstructing as well, for some r < n. Note that the definition of linear
secret sharing does not guarantee any privacy. Although any interesting schemes do in
fact offer privacy, it is convenient not to include this as a requirement in the definition
here.
Note that we will not consider any of the more general definitions of linear secret
sharing from the literature in this paper, such as those allowing the secrets (or the
shares) to be vectors rather than single field elements.
Definition 3.1 (multiplicative linear secret sharing [8]). Let Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0)
be a linear secret sharing scheme over Fq. It is multiplicative (M1) if there is an
Fq-linear form ρ : F
n
q −→ Fq such that, for all x, y ∈ V ,
ρ(z1, . . . , zn) = π0(x) · π0(y),
where
(z1, . . . , zn) = (π1(x) · π1(y), . . . , πn(x) · πn(y)).
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In other words, the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the
vector consisting of the coordinatewise product of two respective share-vectors. This
is a special property that is not generally satisfied by linear secret sharing schemes.
Please refer to [8, 7] for more information about constructions and bounds. The mul-
tiplicative property can be characterized in terms of the properties of the symmetric
bilinear forms πi ⊗ πi.
Proposition 3.2. A linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) is M1 if
and only if π0 ⊗ π0 is in the span of {πi ⊗ πi}ni=1.
Proof. By Definition 3.1, Σ is M1 if and only if there exist λ1, . . . , λn ∈ Fq such
that π0(x) · π0(y) =
∑n
i=1 λiπi(x) · πi(y) for all x, y ∈ V .
Given Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) and a set A of players and a set A of players, we
notate ΣA for the linear secret sharing scheme ΣA = (|A|, k, (πi)i∈{0}∪A), that is, the
restriction of Σ to the players in A.
Definition 3.3. A linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) is said to be
t-strongly multiplicative if Σ has t-privacy and, for every set A consisting of n − t
players, ΣA is a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme.
4. Our contributions. The focus in this paper is on the following theoretical
question, which is novel to the best of our knowledge. Consider multiplicative linear
secret sharing, where the product of two secrets is obtained as a linear function of the
vector consisting of the coordinatewise product of two respective share-vectors. Sup-
pose we abandon the linearity condition and instead make the relaxed requirement
that this product is obtained by some not-necessarily-linear function. Is the result-
ing notion equivalent to multiplicative linear secret sharing? We show the (perhaps
somewhat counterintuitive) result that this relaxed notion is strictly more general.
Definition 4.1 (relaxation of multiplicative secret sharing). Let
Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0)
be a linear secret sharing scheme over Fq. The scheme has product reconstruction
(M2) if, for all x, x′, y, y′ ∈ V with
π1(x) · π1(y) = π1(x′) · π1(y′), . . . , πn(x) · πn(y) = πn(x′) · πn(y′),
it holds that
π0(x) · π0(y) = π0(x′) · π0(y′).
Note that the product reconstruction condition is equivalent to the existence of
a product reconstruction function ρ′ : Fnq −→ Fq such that
ρ′(π1(x) · π1(y), . . . , πn(x) · πn(y)) = π0(x) · π0(y)
for all x, y ∈ V . In particular, a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme (see
Definition 3.1) is one for which a linear product reconstruction function exists. Thus,
the M1 condition implies the M2 condition. As a consequence of our results, the
converse does not hold.
Remark 4.2. There does not appear to be much that one can say, a priori, about
the complexity of such not-necessarily-linear product reconstruction functions. At
best, one can say that in order to determine the product of two secrets from the
coordinatewise product of two corresponding share-vectors, it suffices to solve a system
of quadratic equations.
Main Theorem 4.3. Let Fq be the finite field of q elements. There exists a
function tq(n) ∈ Ω(n) such that for infinitely many values of n ∈ N, there exists
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
09
/1
9/
19
 to
 1
92
.1
6.
19
1.
14
0.
 R
ed
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
su
bje
ct 
to 
SIA
M 
lic
en
se 
or 
co
py
rig
ht;
 se
e h
ttp
://w
ww
.si
am
.or
g/j
ou
rna
ls/
ojs
a.p
hp
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © by SIAM. Unauthorized reproduction of this article is prohibited. 
LSSS WITH NONLINEAR PRODUCT RECONSTRUCTION 1121
a linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) over Fq such that it has tq(n)-
privacy and such that it admits a product reconstruction function (M 2). However,
such function is necessarily not Fq-linear. Therefore, it is not a multiplicative linear
secret sharing scheme (i.e., not M 1).
We next state other results that are proved in this work. The following two
theorems prove that, for every finite field Fq with q ≥ 3, n = 9 is the minimum value
for which there exists an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on n players that is M2 but
not M1. This value remains undetermined for q = 2, but it is at least 9.
Theorem 4.4. For every finite field Fq with q ≥ 3, there exists an Fq-linear
secret sharing scheme on 9 players that is M 2 but not M 1. In addition, there exists
an F2-linear secret sharing scheme on 14 players that is M 2 but not M 1.
Theorem 4.5. Every M 2 linear secret sharing scheme on at most 8 players is
also M1.
In addition, we extend our separation result to the notion of strong multiplication.
Theorem 4.6. Let Fq be the finite field of q elements. There exists a function
tˆq(n) ∈ Ω(n) such that for an unbounded number n ∈ N, there exists a linear secret
sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) over Fq such that Σ has tˆq(n)-privacy and for each
set A consisting of n − tˆq(n) players, ΣA admits a product reconstruction function
(M 2). However, there exists a set A with n− tˆq(n) players such that ΣA is not M 1.
Therefore, Σ is not a tˆq(n)-strongly multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme.
5. Separating quadrating forms. In this section, we characterize properties
M1 and M2, or rather, their negations, separately. The characterization of the M2
property is given in terms of a class of quadratic forms, which we call separating. We
provide a characterization for this class.
Proposition 5.1 (not-M1 characterization). Let Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) be an Fq-
linear secret sharing scheme. Then Σ is not M1 if and only if there exists a quadratic
form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) such that Q(π1) = · · · = Q(πn) = 0 and Q(π0) = 0.
Proof. This is straightforward from Proposition 3.2, Lemma 2.1, and the isomor-
phism between Sym(V )∗ and Quad(V ∗) in Lemma 2.5.
Given x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V , consider the bilinear form Tx,y,x′,y′ = x ⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′ ∈
Bil(V ∗) and its associated quadratic form Qx,y,x′,y′ ∈ Quad(V ∗). A quadratic form
Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) is called separating if Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ for every x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V .
Proposition 5.2 (not-M2 characterization). Let Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) be an Fq-
linear secret sharing scheme. Then Σ is not M2 if and only if there exist vectors
x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V such that Qx,y,x′,y′(π1) = · · · = Qx,y,x′,y′(πn) = 0 and Qx,y,x′,y′(π0) =
0.
Proof. This is obvious from Definition 4.1.
As a consequence of the last two theorems, Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) is M2 but not
M1 if and only if and only if there exists a quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) such that
Q(π1) = · · · = Q(πn) = 0 and Q(π0) = 0 and all such quadratic forms are separating.
Next two propositions provide a characterization of the separating forms.
Proposition 5.3. No quadratic form of rank r ≤ 3 is separating. All quadratic
forms of rank r ≥ 5 are separating.
Proof. If Q is not separating, then Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ for some x, y, x
′, y′ ∈ V .
Then the associated bilinear form B˜Q defined at the end of section 2 is given by
B˜Q = x ⊗ y + y ⊗ x − x′ ⊗ y′ − y′ ⊗ x′. By Lemma 2.2, this bilinear form has rank
at most 4. This directly implies that nonseparating forms have rank at most 4, since
in the case charFq = 2, when the rank of B˜Q is exactly 4 it is easy to see that Q is
identically zero in RadQ V . This proves the second claim of the theorem.
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1122 CASCUDO, CRAMER, MIRANDOLA, PADRO´, AND XING
We prove the first statement for forms of rank r = 3. The proofs for the cases
with r ≤ 2 similar. Let Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) be a quadratic form of rank 3. Clearly, we can
assume that k = dim V = 3.
Suppose first that charFq = 2. By the classification of quadratic forms, there
exists a basis {e1, e2, e3} of V such that, for some α ∈ F∗q , the matrix associated to
the symmetric bilinear form BQ is ⎛
⎝0 1 01 0 0
0 0 α
⎞
⎠ .
Therefore, Q is not separating because BQ = e1 ⊗ e2 + e2 ⊗ e1 + αe3 ⊗ e3, and this
implies that Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ with x = 2e1, y = e2, x
′ = αe3, and y′ = −e3.
Assume now that charFq = 2. By the classification of quadratic forms, Q is
determined by a bilinear form T ∈ Bil(V ∗) such that its matrix in some suitable basis
{e1, e2, e3} of V is ⎛
⎝0 1 00 0 0
0 0 1
⎞
⎠ .
Then T = Te1,e2,e3,e3 , and hence Q is not separating.
It remains to study what happens for quadratic forms of rank r = 4. Briefly,
up to equivalence, there are two quadratic forms of rank 4, and only one of them is
separating.
Proposition 5.4. If charFq = 2, a quadratic form of rank r = 4 is separating if
and only if its discriminant is −1. If charFq = 2, a quadratic form of rank r = 4 is
separating if and only if its Arf invariant is 1.
Proof. Let Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) be a quadratic form of rank r = 4. As before, we can
assume that k = dimV = 4. Suppose that Q is not separating, that is, Q = Qx,y,x′,y′
for some x, y, x′, y′.
Suppose that charFq = 2. Then the symmetric bilinear form associated to Q is
BQ =
1
2
(x ⊗ y + y ⊗ x)− 1
2
(x′ ⊗ y′ + y′ ⊗ x′).
If {x, y, x′, y′} is a linearly dependent set, then rkBQ ≤ 3 by Lemma 2.2. Therefore,
{x, y, x′, y′} is a basis of V . The determinant of the matrix of BQ in this basis is equal
to (1/4)2, and hence the discriminant of Q is equal to 1.
If charFq = 2, then B˜Q = x⊗ y+ y⊗ x+ x′ ⊗ y′ + y′ ⊗ x′. Again, {x, y, x′, y′} =
{e1, e2, e3, e4} is a basis of V . Let {e1, e2, e3, e4} be the dual basis of V ∗. The Arf
invariant of Q is equal to 0 because Q(ei) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4 and hence Q(e1)Q(e2)+
Q(e3)Q(e4) = 0.
6. Finding exotic schemes. We apply here the results in section 5 to find
examples of linear secret sharing schemes that are M2 but not M1. Specifically, we
prove Theorem 4.4 and present some additional examples of interest.
Associated to an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0), consider the
subspace
W (Σ) = 〈{πi ⊗ πi}i=1,...,n〉 ⊂ Sym(V )
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and its annihilator
I(Σ) = {φ ∈ Sym(V )∗ : φ(B) = 0 for every B ∈ W (Σ)} ⊂ Sym(V )∗ ∼= Quad(V ∗).
Recall that Σ is M1 if and only if π0⊗π0 ∈ W (Σ). By linear algebra, these subspaces
satisfy
dimW (Σ) + dim I(Σ) = dimSym(V ) =
k(k + 1)
2
.
IfW (Σ) = Sym(V ), then π0⊗π0 ∈ W (Σ), and hence Σ is M1. In the case dimW (Σ) =
dimSym(V )−1, we obtain the following sufficient condition for a linear secret sharing
scheme to be M2 but not M1.
Proposition 6.1 (sufficient separation conditions). Suppose that Σ satisfies the
following conditions:
1. dimW (Σ) = dim Sym(V )− 1.
2. There is a separating quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) such that Q(πi) = 0 for
i = 1, . . . , n while Q(π0) = 0.
Then Σ has product reconstruction (is M 2), but Σ does not have linear product re-
construction (is not M 1).
Proof. Condition 2 implies that Σ is not M1. The subspace I(Σ) ⊂ Sym(V )∗
has dimension 1, so I(Σ) = 〈Q〉, where Q is the separating form in Condition 2.
Therefore, all nonzero elements in I(Σ) are separating, which implies that Σ is M2 by
Proposition 5.2.
At this point, we can apply this sufficient condition to present the first example of
a linear secret sharing scheme that is M2 but not M1. Take q = 5 and V = F55, and fix a
basis of V . Consider the symmetric bilinear form T ∈ Sym(V ∗) that is represented by
the 5×5 identity matrix and the quadratic form Q that is determined by T . Obviously,
rkQ = 5, and hence Q is separating by Proposition 5.3. Our example is a linear secret
sharing scheme Σ = (14, V, (πi)
14
i=0) such that dimW (Σ) = dimSym(V )− 1 = 14 and
I(Σ) = 〈Q〉. That is, we have to find π0, . . . , π14 ∈ V ∗ such that {πi ⊗ πi}14i=1 is
linearly independent, Q(πi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 14, and Q(π0) = 0. Then Σ is M2
but not M1 by Proposition 6.1. A suitable choice for (πi)
14
i=0 is given by the column
vectors of the following matrix:⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 2 0 0 0 1 1
1 0 2 0 0 2 0
1 0 0 2 0 0 2
2 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 3 0 0
0 2 0 1 0 0 3 0
2 0 2 2 0 0 0 3
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
It is easy to see that Σ achieves 2-privacy.
We again use Proposition 6.1 to present a similar example over F2. Take V = F
5
2
and fix a basis for V . Consider the quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) defined by the
bilinear form T with matrix ⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .Do
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Observe that Q is separating because it has rank 5. Reasoning as in the previous
example, we obtain that the linear secret sharing scheme determined by the matrix⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
is M2 but not M1.
Similarly to the first one, the following example is again linear secret sharing
scheme Σ with dimension k = 5 over F5, but in this case the number of players is
reduced to n = 13. This is achieved by taking dim I(Σ) = 2. Consider the quadratic
forms Q1, Q2 ∈ Quad(V ∗) determined by the symmetric bilinear forms with matrices
M1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 2 0
0 0 0 0 2
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , M2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 2 0
0 1 2 0 0
1 0 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ ,
respectively. One can check that all nonzero linear combinations of these two matrices
have rank 5. As a consequence, all nonzero forms in 〈Q1, Q2〉 have rank 5, and
hence they are separating. Next, we present a linear secret sharing scheme Σ =
(13,F55, (πi)
13
i=0) such that it is not M1 and I(Σ) = 〈Q1, Q2〉. Clearly, Σ is M2. A
possible choice is given by the columns of the matrix⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 2 3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 2 3 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 2 3
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 4 1 1 4
1 3 3 1 4 1 4
3 1 1 1 4 0 0
0 3 2 0 0 4 4
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ .
There exist separating quadratic forms of rank 4, and they have been characterized
in Proposition 5.4. Therefore, we can apply Proposition 6.1 to find examples with
dimension k = 4 on 9 = k(k+1)/2−1 players. In each of the three following examples,
we consider V = F4q, where the characteristic of the field is different from 2, and a
quadratic form Q ∈ Quad(V ∗) that is determined by a symmetric matrix
D =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 α
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Take q = 3 and α = −1. As the determinant of D is not a square in F3, Q is
separating. In addition, Q has at least nine different zeros in F43, so we can construct a
linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (9,F43, (πi)
9
i=0) which is M2 but not M1. An example
is ⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 1 0 0 2 0 0 2 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 2 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .Do
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The previous example generalizes as follows. Take α = −1 and a prime power
q such that −1 is not a square in Fq. As before, Q is separating. Observe that
a2+b2 = 0 for every a, b ∈ F∗q because −1 is not a square in Fq. Therefore, there exist
a, b, c ∈ F∗q with a2 + b2 + c2 = 0. The previous discussion implies that the matrix⎛
⎜⎝
1 1 0 0 −1 0 0 −a a a
0 0 1 0 0 −1 0 b −b b
0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 c c −c
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
⎞
⎟⎠
defines a linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (9,F4q, (πi)
9
i=0) that is M2 but not M1.
We now consider the case of a field Fq with charFq = 2 containing a square root
i of −1. Let α be a nonsquare in Fq, and assume further that α = i. Note that this
choice is always possible, replacing i with −i if necessary. Again, Q is separating, and
we find another linear secret sharing scheme that is M2 but not M1⎛
⎜⎜⎝
1 1 1 0 1 1 α+12
α+1
2 0
α+1
2
0 i 0 1 −i 0 i(α−1)2 0 α+12 i(α−1)2
0 0 i i 0 −i 0 i(α−1)2 i(α−1)2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i i i −i
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ .
Finally, we present another example on nine players, this time over fields of char-
acteristic 2. Let Fq = F2[α] with α ∈ F2 be an arbitrary field extension of F2, and
assume Tr(α) = 1. Note that it is always possible to choose such an α. So the form
Q =
⎛
⎜⎝
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 α
⎞
⎟⎠
is separating and yields the separating scheme
Σ =
⎛
⎜⎝
1 1 0 1 α1/2 α1/2 α1/2 1 α2 1
1 0 1 1 α1/2 α1/2 1 α1/2 1 α2
1 0 0 1 0 1 α1/2 α1/2 α α
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
⎞
⎟⎠ .
Note that in the case of Fq = F2, we have α = α
2 = α1/2 = 1 and this construction
gives a scheme that is M1.
7. Composition and proof of the main result. We discuss here how to ob-
tain larger examples from small ones by using the composition of linear secret sharing
schemes. This is a known operation in secret sharing that consists in substituting a
player by several players by distributing its share using another linear secret sharing
scheme. By using this tool and the examples in section 6, we present proofs for Main
Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.6.
Let Σ′ = (n, V ′, (π′i)
n
i=0) and Σ
′′ = (m,V ′′, (π′′i )
m
i=0) be linear secret sharing
scheme over Fq. Consider the vector space
V = {(x′, x′′) ∈ V ′ × V ′′ : π′n(x′) = π′′0 (x′′)} ⊂ V ′ × V ′′.
Then V ∗ = ((V ′)∗ × (V ′′)∗)/〈(π′n,−π′′0 )〉. Let (α, β) ∈ V ∗ denote the class of the
vector (α, β) ∈ (V ′)∗ × (V ′′)∗. Consider the linear secret sharing scheme Σ = (n +
m− 1, V, (πi)n+m−1i=0 ), where
• πi = (π′i, 0) if i = 0, . . . , n− 1,
• πn+j−1 = (0, π′′j ) if j = 1, . . . ,m.
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The linear secret sharing scheme Σ is called the composition of Σ′ with Σ′′ and is
denoted by Σ = Σ′[Σ′′]. In this composition, the player n of the scheme Σ′ has been
substituted by the set of players of the scheme Σ′′.
The player sets of Σ′ and Σ′′ can be identified, respectively, with {1, . . . , n−1, p0}
and {n, . . . , n+m− 1}. Here, p0 denotes the player of the scheme Σ′ corresponding
to the linear form π′n. For a set A ⊂ {1, . . . , n+m− 1}, take A′ = A∩ {1, . . . , n− 1}
and A′′ = A ∩ {n, . . . , n+m− 1}. Then A is accepting for Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] if and only if
A′ is accepting for Σ′ or A′ ∪ {p0} is accepting for Σ′ and A′′ is accepting for Σ′′. In
particular, Σ has t-privacy if Σ′ has t-privacy. Take β0 = (π′n, 0) = (0, π′′0 ) ∈ V ∗.
Lemma 7.1. The following properties hold:
1. 〈{πi}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{πi}n+m−1i=n 〉 ⊂ 〈{β0}〉.
2. 〈{πi ⊗ πi}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{πi ⊗ πi}n+m−1i=n 〉 ⊂ 〈{β0 ⊗ β0}〉.
Proof. The first property is obvious, while the second one is a straightforward
consequence of the first one.
Consider the linear secret sharing scheme Σ′ \ {p0} = (n− 1, V, (π′i)n−1i=0 ), that is,
the linear secret sharing scheme that is obtained by removing player p0 from Σ
′.
Proposition 7.2. Suppose that Σ′ \ {p0} is not a multiplicative linear secret
sharing scheme (M 1). Then the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is a multiplicative linear
secret sharing scheme if and only if Σ′ and Σ′′ are so.
Proof. Sufficiency is clear. To prove necessity, observe that
〈{πi ⊗ πi}n−1i=0 〉 ∩ 〈{πi ⊗ πi}n+m−1i=n 〉 = 〈{β0 ⊗ β0}〉
if the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is a multiplicative linear secret sharing scheme.
Proposition 7.3. If both Σ′ and Σ′′ have product reconstruction (M 2), then the
composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] has product reconstruction too.
Proof. Suppose that Σ is not M2 and Σ′′ is M2. Then there exists T ∈ Bil(V ∗)
with rkT ≤ 2 such that T (πi, πi) = 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m + n − 1 and T (π0, π0) = 1.
Consider the bilinear forms T ′ ∈ Bil((V ′)∗) and T ′′ ∈ Bil((V ′′)∗) defined by
T ′(α1, α2) = T
(
(α1, 0), (α2, 0)
)
and T ′′(β1, β2) = T
(
(0, β1), (0, β2)
)
.
Observe that rkT ′, rkT ′′ ≤ 2. Since Σ′′ is M2 and T ′′(π′′j , π′′j ) = 0 for every j =
1, . . . ,m, we have that
0 = T ′′(π′′0 , π
′′
0 ) = T (β0, β0) = T
′(π′n, π
′
n).
Therefore, Σ′ is not M2 because T ′(π′0, π′0) = T (π0, π0) = 1 and T ′(π′i, π
′
i) = 0 for
every i = 1, . . . , n.
By composing Shamir’s threshold secret sharing scheme [16] with the small exam-
ples in section 6, linear secret sharing schemes that are M2 but not M1 are obtained
for an arbitrarily large number of players. Indeed, for every t ≥ 1 and for every prime
power q ≥ 2t+1, Shamir’s (t+1, 2t+1)-threshold secret sharing scheme (or a variant
of it if q = 2t+ 1), which has t-privacy and (t + 1)-reconstruction, provides a multi-
plicative (M1) Fq-linear secret sharing scheme Σ
′ on n′ = 2t + 1 players. Moreover,
Σ′ \ {p0} is not M1 for every player p0. If Σ′′ is one of the examples over Fq on nine
players in section 6, then by Propositions 7.2 and 7.3, the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is
an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on n = 2t + 9 players with t-privacy that is M2
but not M1.
The same idea can be used to construct examples for the notion of strong mul-
tiplication. For every t ≥ 1 and for every prime power q ≥ 3t + 1, a t-strongly
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multiplicative Fq-linear secret sharing scheme Σ
′ on n′ = 3t + 1 players is obtained
from Shamir’s (t+1, 3t+1)-threshold scheme. Consider, as before, a scheme Σ′′ con-
veniently chosen among the examples in section 6 and the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′].
Then, Σ is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on n = 3t + 9 players with t-privacy
such that the scheme ΣA is M2 for every set A of n− t players, but ΣA is not M1 for
some set A with n− t players.
The previous constructions prove neither Main Theorem 4.3 nor Theorem 4.6,
but the proofs for those results are derived in a very similar way.
The algebraic geometric constructions from [3, 4, 6] provide, for every finite field
Fq and for infinitely many values of n
′ ∈ N, multiplicative (M1) linear secret sharing
schemes Σ′ over Fq on n′ players that have t-privacy with t = Ω(n′). By removing
some players, we can assume that there is a player p0 such that Σ
′ \ {p0} is not M1.
Let Σ′′ be one of the schemes over Fq on 9 (or 14 if q = 2) players presented in
section 6. Then the composition Σ = Σ′[Σ′′] is an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme on
n = n′ + 8 (or n = n′ + 13 if q = 2) players that has t-privacy with t = Ω(n). By
Propositions 7.2 and 7.3, the scheme Σ is M2 but not M1. This concludes the proof
of Main Theorem 4.3.
The constructions from [3, 4, 6] provide as well, for every finite field Fq and
for infinitely many values of n′ ∈ N, t-strongly multiplicative linear secret sharing
schemes over Fq with t = Ω(n
′). Therefore, Theorem 4.6 can be proved similarly to
Main Theorem 4.3.
8. The smallest examples. We presented in section 6 examples of linear se-
cret sharing schemes of dimension k = 4 on nine players that are M2 but not M1.
The aim of this section is to prove Theorem 4.5, which implies that n = 9 is the
minimum required number of players in order to have a separation between the two
multiplicativity notions.
We begin with some technical lemmas. We notate P = {1, . . . , n} for the set of
players and Q = {0, 1, . . . , n}. An access structure Γ is Q2 if the set of players is not
covered by any two rejecting sets. It is well known that the access structure of every
multiplicative (M1) linear secret sharing scheme is Q2, and it is easy to prove that
the same applies to the M2 property.
Lemma 8.1. If a linear secret sharing scheme is M 2, then its access structure is
Q2.
Proof. Suppose that A and B with A ∪ B = P are rejecting sets for Σ =
(n, V, (πi)
n
i=0). Then there exist x, y ∈ V such that π0(x) = π0(y) = 1, while
πi(x) = 0 for every i ∈ A and πj(y) = 0 for every j ∈ B. By applying Theorem 5.2
to x, y, x′ = 0, y′ = 0, this implies that Σ is not M2.
The accepting sets of the (2, 3)-threshold access structure are precisely those with
at least two players.
Lemma 8.2. Every linear secret sharing scheme for the (2, 3)-threshold access
structure is M 1.
Proof. Let Σ = (3, V, (πi)
3
i=0) be an Fq-linear secret sharing scheme with (2, 3)-
threshold access structure. Then we can assume that dimV = 2. Moreover, {πi, πj}
is linearly independent for every two different i, j ∈ Q. Therefore, there exists a basis
of V such that, for some a, b ∈ F∗q with a = b, the linear forms (πi)3i=0 are given by
the columns of the matrix (
1 0 1 1
0 1 a b
)
.
It is easy to check that Σ is M1.
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Given Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) and X ⊂ P, the linear secret sharing scheme Σ \X is
obtained from Σ by removing the players in X . This operation is called puncturing.
For example, Σ \ {n} = (n− 1, V, (πi)n−1i=0 ).
Lemma 8.3. Suppose that Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) is M 2. If there exists a partition
Q = X0 ∪ X1 with 0 ∈ X0 and X1 = ∅ such that the span of {πi}i∈X0 has trivial
intersection with the span of {πj}j∈X1 , then the scheme Σ \X1 is also M 2.
Proof. Suppose that Σ \X1 is not M2. Then there exist x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V such that
Qx,y,x′,y′(πi) = 0 for every i ∈ X0 \ {0} and Qx,y,x′,y′(π0) = 0. It is not difficult to
check that we can select x, y, x′, y′ ∈ V in such a way that Qx,y,x′,y′(πj) = 0 for every
j ∈ X1. This implies that Σ is not M2.
Given a tuple of vectors (πi)i∈Q with πi ∈ V ∗, a set B ⊂ Q is said to be a basis
(or an independent set) if (πi)i∈B is a basis of V ∗ (or, respectively, it is linearly inde-
pendent). The following is a well-known result from linear algebra and also matroid
theory.
Lemma 8.4. Let B,B′ ⊂ Q be two different bases. Then the following properties
are satisfied:
1. If i ∈ B′ \B, then (B′ \ {i}) ∪ {j} is a basis for some j ∈ B \B′.
2. If i ∈ B′ \B, then (B \ {j}) ∪ {i} is a basis for some j ∈ B \B′.
We proceed now with the proof of Theorem 4.5. Let Σ = (n, V, (πi)
n
i=0) be a
linear secret sharing scheme over Fq on n ≤ 8 players. Suppose that Σ is M2. We
want to prove that Σ is also M1.
The access structure of Σ is denoted by Γ, and minΓ denotes the family of the
minimal accepting sets. Take k = dimV . We can suppose that V ∗ = 〈πi〉ni=1. If there
exists an accepting set formed by a single player, then Σ is M1. From now on, we
assume that all accepting sets have at least two players.
Claim 8.5. k < n.
Proof. Obviously, k ≤ n. If k = n, there exists a basis B ⊂ Q with 0 ∈ B. Then
P = (B \ {0}) ∪ {j} because |B| = n− 1. Therefore, P is the union of two rejecting
sets and Γ is not Q2, a contradiction.
We prove in Claim 8.7 that Σ is M1 if k ≤ 4. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 8.6. Assume dimV = 4 and let {π1, . . . , π4} be an Fq-basis of V ∗.
Let Q1, Q2 ∈ Quad(V ∗) be linearly independent and such that Qj(πi) = 0 for all
i = 1, . . . , 4 and j = 1, 2. Then there exists λ ∈ Fq such that Q1 + λQ2 is not
separating.
Proof. Let U1, U2 ∈ F4×4q be the unique upper-triangular matrices associated to
Q1 and Q2, respectively, in the basis {π1, . . . , π4} of V ∗. Then
U1 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 α1
0 0
A1
0
0 β1
0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ , U2 =
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0 α2
0 0
A2
0
0 β2
0 0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
for some α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ Fq, A1, A2 ∈ F2×2q . Reordering the basis, we may assume
that α2 = 0. Take λ = −α1/α2. Then the matrix U3 = U1 + λU2 has rank at most
2. This implies, by Lemma 2.2, that the bilinear form whose associated matrix is U3
is of the form x⊗ y − x′ ⊗ y′ for some x, y, x′, y′ ∈ F4q and therefore Q1 + λQ2 is not
separating.
Claim 8.7. If k ≤ 4, then Σ is M 1.
Proof. By Proposition 5.3, Σ is M1 if k ≤ 3. Suppose that k = 4. Since
dimSym(V ) = 10, we have that dim I(Σ) ≥ 2. By iterated application of Lemma 8.6,
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we can replace all separating forms in a basis of I(Σ) with nonseparating forms,
obtaining a basis (Qj)
r
j=1 of I(Σ) consisting entirely of nonseparating forms. Since
Σ is M2, Qj(π0) = 0 for all j = 1 . . . , r, and hence π0 ∈ W (Σ). Therefore, Σ is
M1.
From now on, we suppose that 5 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, and hence 6 ≤ n ≤ 8. Take a set
B ⊂ Q such that 0 ∈ B and B is a basis. (Such a set always exists.) Then X =
B \ {0} /∈ Γ, and hence Y = P \X ∈ Γ because Γ is Q2. In addition, |Y | = n− k+1.
Claim 8.8. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M 1.
Proof. If Y is a minimal accepting subset, then Y is independent. Since π0 is
in the span of {πj}j∈Y , there exists X1 ⊂ X such that B′ = X1 ∪ Y is a basis. By
Lemma 8.4, for every i ∈ X \ X1 ⊂ B \ B′, there exists j ∈ B′ \ B = Y such that
B′′i = (B \ {i}) ∪ {j} is a basis. This implies that B′′i \ {0} = (X \ {i}) ∪ {j} is not
in Γ, and hence its complement (Y \ {j}) ∪ {i} is accepting. Then, πi is in the span
of {π :  ∈ (Y \ {j}) ∪ {0}} because Y \ {j} /∈ Γ, and hence πi is in the span of
{π}∈Y . Therefore, every vector πi with i ∈ Q \X1 is in the span of {π}∈Y . Take
X0 = Q \X1. Since X1 ∪ Y is a basis, the span of {πi}i∈X0 has trivial intersection
with the span of {πj}j∈X1 . Therefore, Σ′ = Σ \ {X1} is M2 by Lemma 8.3. The
dimension of Σ′ is k− |X1| = n− k+ 1 ≤ 4. Then, Σ′ is M1 by Claim 8.7, and hence
so is Σ.
Claim 8.9. If k = n− 1, then Σ is M 1.
Proof. Since |Y | = n − k + 1 = 2, we have that Y is a minimal accepting set.
Apply Claim 8.8.
As a consequence, Σ is M1 if n = 6. From now on, we assume that 7 ≤ n ≤ 8
and 5 ≤ k ≤ n− 2.
Claim 8.10. If every pair {i, j} ⊂ Q with i = j is independent and k = n − 2,
then Σ is M 1.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can suppose that B = {0, 4, . . . , n} and
Y = {1, 2, 3}. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8. Otherwise,
we can assume that {1, 2} ∈ minΓ. If π3 is in the span of {π1, π2}, then Σ′ = Σ\(P\Y )
is a (2, 3)-threshold scheme and Σ′ is M1 by Lemma 8.2. This implies that Σ is M1.
Otherwise, we can assume that {1, 2, 3, . . . , n − 2} is a basis. Since π0 is a linear
combination of {π1, π2}, {0, 2, 3, . . . , n− 2} is a basis, and hence {1, n− 1, n} ∈ Γ. If
this is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8. Since B = {0, 4, . . . , n}
is a basis, {n− 1, n} /∈ Γ. Without loss of generality, we can assume that {1, n} ∈ Γ.
Then, Σ \ (P \ {1, 2, n}) is a (2, 3)-threshold scheme, and hence Σ is M1.
Claim 8.11. If k = n− 2, then Σ is M 1.
Proof. Suppose n = 7 and k = 5. If the pair {πi, πj} is linearly dependent, then
by removing (puncturing) one of these players, an M2 linear secret sharing scheme
on six players is obtained, which is also M1. Otherwise, Σ is M1 by Claim 8.10. The
proof is analogous for the case n = 8 and k = 6.
At this point, only the case n = 8, k = 5 remains unproven. Since every M2
linear secret sharing scheme on seven players is M1, we can suppose that every pair
{i, j} ⊂ Q with i = j is independent.
Claim 8.12. Consider Z ⊂ Q with 3 ≤ |Z| ≤ 4 and 0 ∈ Z. Let W be the span
of {πj}j∈Z and take C = {i ∈ Q : πi ∈ W}. If |C| ≥ |Z|+ 3, then Σ is M 1.
Proof. Take Z ′ ⊂ Z such that {πj}j∈Z′ is a basis of W . Take A = Q \ C ⊂ P .
By a simple case analysis, it is not difficult to check that there exist disjoint sets
A1, A2 ⊂ A such that A1 ∪ A2 = A and {πj}j∈Z′∪Ai is linearly independent for
i = 1, 2.
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Suppose that Σ is not M1. Then, Σ′ = Σ\A is not M1 and, since its dimension is
|Z ′| ≤ 4, it is not M2. Then, there exists a quadratic form Q = Qx,y,x′,y′ ∈ Quad(V ∗)
such that Q(π0) = 0 while Q(πi) = 0 for every i ∈ C \ {p0}. Moreover, by basic linear
algebra, there exist vectors u, v, u′, v′ ∈ V such that
• π(u) = π(x), π(v) = π(y), π(u′) = π(x′), and π(v′) = π(y′) for all π ∈ W ,
• πi(u) = πi(u′) = 0 for every i ∈ A1, and
• πj(v) = πj(v′) = 0. for every j ∈ A2.
Consider the quadratic form Q′ = Qu,v,u′,v′ . Observe that Q′(πi) = Q(πi) if i ∈ C
and Q′(πj) = 0 if j /∈ C. This implies that Σ is not M2, a contradiction.
Without loss of generality, B = {0, 5, 6, 7, 8} is a basis. Let Y = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Remember that Y is an accepting set. If Y is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1
by Claim 8.8. Otherwise, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. {1, 2, 3} is a minimal accepting set. We consider two subcases, depending
on whether π4 is in the span of {π1, π2, π3} or not. If yes, we can assume that
{1, 2, 3, 5, 6} is a basis. Then every set of the form {0, x, y, 5, 6} with x, y ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and x = y is a basis, and hence every set of the form {i, 4, 7, 8} with i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
is accepting. If one of them is a minimal accepting set, then Σ is M1 by Claim 8.8.
Observe that {7, 8} /∈ Γ because {7, 8} ⊂ B. If {i, 4, j} ∈ Γ for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and
j ∈ {7, 8} such that {i, 4} /∈ Γ, then πj is in the span of {π0, πi, π4} and Σ is M1 by
Claim 8.12 with Z = {0, 1, 2} (since π3,π4,πj are in the span of {π0, π1, π2}). If a set of
the form {i, 7, 8} with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is accepting, then π8 is in the span of {π0, πi, π7},
and hence the dimension of the span of {π0, π1, π2, π3, π4, π7, π8} is at most 4. Again,
Σ is M1 by Claim 8.12. Suppose now that π4 is not in the span of {π1, π2, π3}. Then
we can assume that {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis. By using a similar argument as before,
every set of the form {i, 6, 7, 8} with i = 1, 2, 3 is accepting. Since {6, 7, 8} is not
accepting, the vector πi is in the span of {π0, π6, π7, π8} for every i = 1, 2, 3. Apply
Claim 8.12 with Z = {0, 6, 7, 8}.
Case 2. All minimal accepting subsets of Y have exactly two players. We can
assume that {1, 2} ∈ Γ. By Lemma 8.2, we can assume that {π1, π2, π3} is linearly
independent. Suppose that π4 is in the span of {π1, π2, π3} and that {1, 2, 3, 5, 6} is
a basis. Then B′ = {p0, 2, 3, 5, 6} is a basis and Y ′ = {1, 4, 7, 8} ∈ Γ. If Y ′ is a
minimal accepting set or {1, 4} ∈ Γ, then Σ is M1. If there is a minimal accepting
subset of Y ′ with cardinality 3, then we can reduce to Case 1. Since {7, 8} ⊂ B, this
set is not accepting. The only remaining case is that there exists an accepting set
{i, j} with i ∈ {1, 4} and j ∈ {7, 8}. Then πj is in the span of {π1, π2, π3} and Σ
is M1 by Claim 8.12. Suppose now that π4 is not in the span of {π1, π2, π3}. Then
we can assume that {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis. Then B′ = {p0, 2, 3, 4, 5} is a basis and
Y ′ = {1, 6, 7, 8} ∈ Γ. The proof is concluded by using a similar argument as before.
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